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Security vulnerabilities are inextricably linked to information systems. Unable to eliminate these 
vulnerabilities, the security community is left to minimize their impact. Unfortunately, current 
reward structures may be skewed towards benefiting nefarious usage of vulnerability information 
rather than responsible disclosure. Recently suggested market-based mechanisms offer some hope 
by providing incentives to responsible security researchers. However, concerns exist that any 
benefits gained through increased incentives may be more than lost through information leakage. 
Using two years of security alert data, we examine the effectiveness of market-based mechanisms. 
While market-mechanisms do not reduce the likelihood that a vulnerability will be exploited, we 
find evidence that markets increase the time to vulnerability exploit and decrease the overall 
volume of alerts. 
Keywords:  Information security/privacy, IS policy, Vulnerability disclosure 
Résumé 
Les failles de sécurité sont inextricablement liées aux systèmes d'information. Celles-ci étant difficiles à éliminer, le 
service de sécurité a pour but de minimiser leur impact. Les mécanismes basés sur le marché apportent un espoir en 
attribuant des primes aux chercheurs chargés d’assurer la sécurité. Utilisant deux ans de données d'alerte, nous 
avons la preuve que les marchés favorisent au contraire l’exploitation des failles et diminuent le volume d'alertes. 
Introduction 
The unfortunate reality of widespread security vulnerabilities in technology products is an important topic not only 
to security and information systems professionals but also to consumers, business and policy makers.  Modern 
commerce depends on information systems, yet security vulnerabilities pose ever-present risks which are no longer 
isolated to technical staff.  In fact, policy aspects are increasing important as “incentives are becoming as important 
as technical design” (Anderson and Moore 2006, p. 610).  Much of the incentive debate has focused on the 
discovery and disclosure of vulnerabilities and the associated incentives for provision of research effort towards 
discovery.  
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The security community relies on the others in the community to disclose vulnerabilities when found.  Historically, 
researchers have not been directly compensated for their efforts in discovering vulnerabilities.  In this sense, 
vulnerability research can be considered a public good—consumption of security information does not preclude 
others from using the information as well.  Like other public goods, without additional incentives, security will be 
insufficiently provided (Garcia and Horowitz 2007).  Therefore, vulnerability markets have been proposed to 
encourage researchers to provide this public good (Schechter 2004).  Several private vulnerability markets are 
currently in existence, including iDefense and the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI).  Summarizing data from the National 
Vulnerability Database, iDefense and ZDI, Figure 1 depicts the percentage of vulnerability disclosures made 
through a market mechanism for each year since 2000.  While market disclosures remain a small fraction of the total 
disclosures, the markets are being increasingly used.  So far in 2008, disclosures through market mechanism have 














































Figure 1: Percentage of Vulnerabilities Reported through a Market Mechanism 
Despite their increased use, the impact of such markets is far from clear.  By providing compensation for research, 
more effort should be expended.  Yet, while markets create incentives for research and discovery, they have 
drawbacks.  Because the private vulnerability markets focus on their own profit maximizing strategy, they have an 
incentive to leak vulnerability information and therefore decrease social welfare (Kannan and Telang 2005).  Private 
vulnerability markets can increase the value for subscribers to their services by increasing the risks and penalties to 
non-subscribers.  Thus, rather than having the desired effect of increasing security, they may instead be contributing 
to an overall decrease in security. 
Thus, the fundamental question remains open—“are markets for vulnerabilities effective?” Our research addresses 
this question through a large scale empirical study of vulnerabilities disclosed through both market and non-market 
mechanisms.  To gauge effectiveness, we examine three measures of effectiveness. 
• Risk Does market disclosure affect the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited? 
• Speed Does market disclosure affect the speed of exploitation of a vulnerability? 
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• Volume Does market disclosure affect the volume of attacks based on the vulnerability? 
We use real alert data from intrusion detection systems.  Notifications, called alerts, are generated by intrusion 
detection systems when a data pattern is seen that is consistent with the data pattern from a vulnerability. Through 
the empirical study of more than 2.4 billion alerts generated from 2006 and 2007, we provide evidence that markets 
for vulnerabilities can be effective.  First, while the overall exploitation of vulnerabilities is the same for market and 
non-market mechanisms, market based disclosures decrease the likelihood that the vulnerability will be exploited 
quickly.  This allows more time for the security community to defend against the exploit through patching or 
developing countermeasures.  Second, we find that market disclosure reduces the volume of alerts resulting from a 
vulnerability. 
Disclosure Environment 
Vulnerabilities exist in all systems whether they are known or unknown.  Of the unknown vulnerabilities, there are 
two methods that a vulnerability can be discovered—labeled malevolent and benign.  The defining distinction 
between the malevolent researcher and the benign researcher is their action upon discovery of the vulnerability.  
Figure 2 depicts the relationships between the sets of vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Figure 2: Discovery of Vulnerabilities 
First, a vulnerability can be found by a malevolent researcher.  This researcher is rewarded through exploiting the 
vulnerability (or, alternatively, selling the vulnerability to others who will exploit the vulnerability.) The total value 
of this reward is the expected value of the sum of the successful exploitations of the vulnerability.  In the case of 
malevolent discovery, the discover benefits most if the vulnerability is kept secret and also is not discovered by a 
benign researcher.  Second, a vulnerability can be found by a benign researcher.  With market mechanisms, the 
researcher is paid a reward by the market for their effort.  (Without the market mechanism, there is no explicit 
monetary reward.) 
These methods work independently, but are related.  Benign researchers can find vulnerabilities that malevolent 
researchers have not found.  However, to be useful for protection, a benign discoverer must use the vulnerability 
information.  Leakage occurs when malevolent researchers learn of the vulnerability through usage.  This leakage 
may be intentional, as private markets have incentives to leak information and increase the value of their services 
(Kannan and Telang 2005) or it may occur inadvertently through reverse engineering of protection systems.  The 
inadvertent leakage is of particular concern.  While reputation effects may discourage intentional leakage, 
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Similarly, malevolent researchers may find vulnerabilities that benign researchers have not already found.  In 
parallel to leakage of benign findings, the malevolent researcher must use the vulnerability to realize value.  Usage 
of the vulnerability in an exploit may increase the likelihood of benign discovery. 
Literature Review 
Research is active in understanding the underlying economics of information security.  Earlier work focused on 
topics such as risk management (Straub and Welke 1998), and handling abuse (Straub and Nance 1990).  More 
recently, (Anderson and Moore 2006) and (Gordon and Loeb 2006) provide overviews of the key complexities 
surrounding the misaligned incentives, negative externalities, and general challenges for information systems 
professionals.  Patching issues such as user incentives (August and Tunca 2006), restricted distribution (Rahman et 
al. 2006), and piracy (August and Tunca 2008) have been of recent research interest. 
Recognizing that vulnerabilities are inevitable, research surrounding disclosure of vulnerabilities has been 
particularly active.  While disclosure announcements can affect the value of software vendor (Telang and Wattal 
2007), public disclosure can, under some conditions, promote social welfare (Nizovtsev and Thursby 2007).  
Further, disclosure itself has several options, each of which has their own strengths and weakness (Arora et al. 
2004), particularly regarding the pressure that disclosure places on vendors.  An importation variation in disclosure 
policy is the time given to vendors for correction prior to public disclosure. Vendors have been shown empirically to 
respond to disclosure (Arora et al. 2005) especially under certain competitive conditions (Arora et al. 2006a).  
Disclosure and patching has also been found to affect the volume of attacks observed in controlled research 
networks called honeypots (Arora  et al. 2004; Arora et al. 2006b) However, while there is great value in the 
controlled environment that honeypots provide, our research is among the first empirical analysis using real, multi-
firm alert data. 
A significant issue in information systems security is the incentives for investment.  Research has shown that 
security can be considered a public good and tends to be under-provisioned (Garcia and Horowitz 2007).  The 
investment in IT security deterrence has been shown to be effective within a firm (Straub 1990).  However, because 
of externalities, underinvestment is likely and regulation has been suggested to improve social welfare but faces 
significant challenges (Garcia and Horowitz 2007). 
As an alternative, market mechanisms have been proposed to address the underinvestment.  Specifically, rather than 
depending on the security community to freely contribute vulnerability research, payments can be used to encourage 
research (Schechter 2004).  This approach recognizes the reward structure for vulnerabilities available in the black 
market (Radianti and Gonzalez 2007) and seeks to offset it.  These markets for vulnerabilities have been suggested 
as an interesting economic model for exploration (Anderson and Moore 2006; Sutton and Nagel 2006).  In addition 
to straight payment structures, auctions have been proposed but they, along with markets, have implementation 
difficulties (Ozment 2004).  In fact, a recent vulnerability auction has been implemented (WabiSabiLabi).  Yet, 
interest in market mechanisms remains the most active with two markets (iDefense and the Zero Day Initiative) in 
active use over the past couple of years. 
The impact of such markets is not clear.  The presence of private infomediaries introduces additional complexity to 
the disclosure and patch cycle (Li and Rao 2007).  A specific concern is that markets have an incentive to leak 
information.  In an analytical model, Kannan and Telang (2005) have shown that markets can reduce social welfare 
due to information leak.  Further, the information leak does not have to be intentional by the markets.  Instead, by 
reverse engineering signatures on intrusion detection systems, markets providing protection to their clients can 
inadvertently disclose vulnerabilities.  Adding further complexity, Kumar et al. (2007) find differential effects from 
different types of information leaks such as vulnerabilities which reveal confidential information.  In an abstract 
sense, much like there are concerns that weapon buyback programs may actually increase the number of guns 
(Mullin 2001), vulnerability purchase programs may increase the number of vulnerabilities. 
Further complicating the analysis is that reward mechanisms have two effects (Cavusoglu et al. 2007).  First, the 
rewards themselves encourage early discovery.  Second, the reward markets provide their information only to a 
group of subscribing users.  Using analytical models, Cavusoglu et al. (2007) show that early discovery does 
improve welfare, but providing information only to subscribing users does not necessarily improve welfare.  Given 
that existing market mechanisms combine these two effects, it is not clear if social welfare is increased or decreased 
by the presence of these markets. 
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Overall, the effects of markets for vulnerabilities are ambiguous as increased incentives may be offset by 
information leakage.  To examine the effectiveness of markets for vulnerabilities, we consider three possibilities. 
• Does disclosure through a market mechanism affect the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited? 
• Does disclosure through a market mechanism affect the speed by which a vulnerability is exploited? 
• Does disclosure through a market mechanism affect the volume of alerts issued from a vulnerability? 
First, not all vulnerabilities disclosed are exploited.  Attackers may find some vulnerabilities more attractive or more 
rewarding than others.  One measure of effectiveness of a market would be if vulnerabilities disclosed through the 
market were more or less likely to be exploited.  Based on the preceding concerns about leakage of information from 
the markets found in prior modeling (Kannan and Telang 2005), we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1A: Disclosure through market mechanisms will increase the likelihood that a vulnerability 
will be exploited. 
Most of the prior analysis of vulnerability disclosure is rooted in analytical economic modeling.  However, the 
sociology and criminology literature can also provide other perspectives on crime and its societal context 
(Braithwaite 1989; Cohen and Felson 1979; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). While less precise than the rational 
choice models of crime in the economics literature (Ehrlich 1996), these theories depict a broader perspective on the 
causes and consequences of crime. A comprehensive review of this literature clearly is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instead, we focus on the relevance of the traditional theories in the context of the market for vulnerability 
disclosures studied in this paper. 
Criminal behavior is learned through association and social interaction with others, as in Differential Association 
theory (Sutherland 1947), the theory of Social Learning (Akers et al. 1979), or the Subculture of Delinquency theory 
(Cohen 1955).  Labeling of individuals as deviants reinforces this behavior.  Attackers and security professionals are 
separate groups with distinct subcultures reinforced through differential association and social learning. Responsible 
disclosure appeals to security professionals, but not to attackers whose subculture is likely to view reporting to a 
mainstream agency as unacceptable. Therefore, it is unlikely that changes to incentives will transform significant 
numbers of malevolent researchers into benign researchers. 
However, Routine Activities theory views motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians 
as pre-requisites of crime (Cohen and Felson 1979). Crime decreases with target hardening or with increasing 
negative consequences. While there will always be motivated offenders, hardening of targets through wide patching 
of vulnerabilities will lower the probability of successful compromise and consequently reduce the incentives for the 
attacker, who moves on to exploit other vulnerabilities.  Thus, shifting the incentives for discovery not only changes 
researcher motivation, it has the secondary effect of changing the potential reward for attackers.  Therefore, a 
contrasting hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1B: Disclosure through market mechanisms will decrease the likelihood that a vulnerability 
will be exploited. 
Second, there are several potential advantages of disclosure through the market-based mechanisms based from 
information sharing among benign researchers.  For example, vendors may be allowed adequate time to develop 
patches to correct the vulnerability, and users are given adequate time to deploy the patches. With this hardening of 
the target, attacks are less likely to be successful for vulnerabilities disclosed through the market mechanisms. 
Further, as more systems are patched within the universe of all systems, vulnerabilities that rely on propagation 
through affected systems are also rendered less effective (August and Tunca 2006; August and Tunca 2008). 
Consequently, the expected economic benefits from vulnerability exploitation are reduced, and attackers expend less 
energy in exploiting the vulnerability (Ehrlich 1996).  Since the discovery mechanisms of markets may get 
information to the defenders more quickly, it can increase the time available for the deployment of countermeasures.  
Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Disclosure through market mechanisms will decrease the likelihood that a vulnerability will 
be exploited soon after the vulnerability is published. 
Third, the discovery of vulnerabilities through markets may decrease the usage of the vulnerability by attackers by 
the preceding reasoning.  Since many of the vulnerabilities reported in non-market-based mechanisms are first 
exploited by attackers and then discovered by security professionals, these vulnerabilities are more likely to be 
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exploited widely, leading to a greater volume of attacks. In summary, proactive discovery of vulnerabilities and 
private disclosure to vendors lowers propagation of attacks through affected systems and thereby reduce the overall 
volume of exploits.  Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: Disclosure through market mechanisms will decrease the number of alerts that are issued for 
a vulnerability. 
Table 1:  Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Percentage Count 
Total  100.00% 13,249 
 Market 2.60% 345 
 Non-Market 97.40% 12,904 
Access Requires local computer access for exploitation 9.53% 1,262 
 Requires adjacent access for exploitation 0.44% 58 
 Requires only network access for exploitation 90.04% 11,929 
Complexity Low complexity 62.84% 8,326 
 Medium complexity 29.41% 3,897 
 High complexity 7.74% 1,026 
Authentication Not required 93.52% 12,391 
 Required 6.48% 858 
Confidentiality Impact No disclosure of confidential information 28.30% 3,750 
 Yes, disclosure of confidential information 71.70% 9,499 
Integrity Impact No impact on integrity of information 21.40% 2,835 
 Yes, impact on integrity of information 78.60% 10,414 
Availability Impact No impact on availability of services 28.40% 3,763 
 Yes, impact on availability of services 71.60% 9,486 
Vulnerability Access: incorrect escalation of privileges 4.95% 656 
 Input: failure to handle input data correctly 51.13% 6,774 
 Design: short comings in the design 11.85% 1,570 
 Exception: failure to handle exceptional states 5.35% 709 
 Environmental: historical, depends on setup 0.24% 32 
 Configuration: improper configuration 0.87% 115 
 Race Condition: failure to sequence events 0.62% 82 
 Other 1.05% 139 
Contains Signature No 97.28% 12,888 
 Yes 2.72% 361 
Patch Available No 66.89% 8,862 
 Yes 33.11% 4,387 
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Data and Methodology 
Data 
To investigate the effectiveness of market mechanisms, our primary datasource is a summarized database of alerts 
generated from intrusion detection systems.  An intrusion detection system (IDS) is installed to protect a network by 
filtering bad or potentially bad traffic from getting into the network.  One way that an IDS works is by looking for 
sequences of data in a packet that match a known sequence associated with a vulnerability.  These known sequences 
are called signatures.  The basic role and function of intrusion detection systems are described in more detail in 
Cavusoglu et al. (2005) and Ransbotham and Mitra (2008). Each time a signature is observed, an alert is generated 
and saved for further analysis.  The alert database is provided by SecureWorks, a managed security service provider.  
The dataset provides a unique forum for research analysis both because it contains real alert data (as opposed to data 
from a research setting) and because the data is from several thousand clients across many industries.  These 
characteristics allow us to examine the actual effectiveness of markets using real data that is not specific to any 
single client.  Unfortunately, real world IDS detection is imperfect, particularly in that it produces false positives due 
to incorrect signatures or configuration.  Signatures may also be refined over time as the SecureWorks operators 
observe alerts.  For the signatures in our final analysis, we verified with SecureWorks that both these focal 
signatures and focal IDS devices did not experience any significant abnormal adjustments.  However, the dataset 
may still contain unknown false positives.  The analysis is based on a summarized set of alerts from 2006 and 2007. 
The key variable of interest is whether or not a vulnerability was disclosed through a market mechanism or through 
a non-market mechanism.  During 2006 and 2007, there were two markets providing incentives for researchers to 
discover and disclose vulnerabilities through their service (iDefense and the Zero Day Initiative).  During that same 
period, there were many other options which did not reward researchers directly.  The most common of these are the 
CERT, Security Focus, XForce, Secunia, Bugtraq and Internet Security Systems X-Force.  We include an indicator 
variable, Market, if a vulnerability was disclosed through one of the two market mechanisms. 
Control Variables 
We match the signatures for a vulnerability with the detailed information available primarily through the National 
Vulnerabilities Database (NVD 2008).  Each vulnerability in the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) is 
assessed using a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).  Through this uniform scoring, we are able to 
control for specific attributes of the vulnerability.  Details on Version 2 of the scoring system are in Mell and 
Romanosky (2008).  From the scoring, we include the following: 
• Access Required: This metric describes the proximity required to exploit the vulnerability.  Proximities are 
scored as local if the attacker must have local access to the potential target,  adjacent if attacker must be 
closely located or remote if the attacker can be across a non-local network. 
• Complexity: Once the attacker has access, vulnerabilities have varying degrees of complexity to exploit and 
are categorized as low, medium, or high complexity.  We include this characteristic because a more 
complex vulnerability may be more difficult to exploit and, if tied to a specific disclosure mechanism in an 
unobservable way, would not measure the market effectiveness. 
• Authentication Required: Some vulnerabilities may be exploited anonymously; others require 
authentication.  We include an indicator if the attacker must pass some authentication step to exploit the 
vulnerability.  While the CVSS indicates the number of authentications required (either None, Single, or 
Multiple), we use an indicator variable Authentication Required if any authentication is required due to a 
low number of multiple authentication vulnerabilities reported. 
• Impact: The potential impact of a vulnerability is categorized as affecting the disclosure of confidential 
information (Confidentiality), the integrity of data (Integrity) or the availability of system resources 
(Availability).  For each, the CVSS reports impacts of None, Partial, or Complete.  However, we use an 
indicator variable for each category if the impact is present.  (There are few partial impact vulnerabilities.) 
Beyond the scoring, there are other aspects of the vulnerability for which we are able to control.  First, the NVD 
includes seven different types of vulnerabilities.  They are incorrect allowance of privileges (Access Validation), 
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failure to handle incorrect input (Input Validation), shortcomings in design of software (Design Error), insufficient 
response to unexpected conditions (Exception Error), weak configuration of settings (Configuration Error), errors 
due to sequencing of events (Race Condition), or uncategorized (Other).  Indicator variables are included for these 
categories.  Second, we include an indicator variable, Patch Available, if a patch was available at the time that the 
vulnerability was disclosure.  Next, we include an indicator variable, Signature Available, if a signature was 
available at the time that the vulnerability was disclosed.  Further, we also include the age of vulnerability measured 
as the number of days since the vulnerability was disclosed.  Finally, in several of the following analyses, we are 
also able to control for changes in trends over time using fixed effects. 
Table 2: Selection of Market or Non-Market Disclosure 











































































Fixed Effects month month month month month month Month 
Log likelihood -1525.252 -1492.871 -1524.638 -1524.915 -1486.892 -1426.771 -1377.621 
Pseudo R2 4.62 6.64 4.65 4.64 7.02 10.73 13.80 
Wald χ2 110.23
*** 180.77*** 110.03*** 111.95*** 183.13*** 278.89*** 378.67*** 
Logit model (Dependent variable is 1=market, 0= non-market), robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
Two-tailed significance: * (p<0.10); ** (p<0.05); *** (p<0.01). n = 13,249 
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Methodology 
First, in our sample of 1252 vulnerabilities for which we had full data with alert signatures matched into the NVD 
database, only 153 (12%) were exploited by attackers.  To examine the difference that market disclosure makes in 











− .  The variable 
ie takes the value of 1 when an exploit of vulnerability i  is observed.  Vector β  is the vector of control variables 
listed in the previous section and variable imarketx ,  is 1  if the market mechanism for disclosure was used.  Further, 
because of the potential for censoring caused by the end of the study, we use a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 
1972) to provide further support.  In the proportional hazard model, the risk of failure (exploitation of a 
vulnerability) at time t  for vulnerability i  is given by βλλ ixi ett
−= )()( 0 .  These analyses allow an empirical 
answer to the competing hypotheses that markets either increase or decrease the likelihood of exploitation of a 
vulnerability (Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis 1B). 
Second, we use another logit model to examine the risk of exploitation shortly after the vulnerability is published.  
The risk of exploitation in the prior analysis only evaluated the risk of exploitation during the entire study period.  
For comparison, we use similar logit regression to determine the risk of exploitation within one month and one week 
of disclosure.  This analysis allows an empirical answer to the hypothesis that markets decrease the likelihood that 
an exploit will be observed soon after disclosure (Hypothesis 2). 
Third, we built a panel dataset which contains the daily count of alerts for each type of vulnerability for the period 
from 2006 to 2007.  By summarizing the 2.4 billion alerts into daily counts, our sample size is reduced to a tractable 
number for analysis.  The sample is then further reduced by the alerts for which we found matching information in 
the NBD.  We use a random effects panel regression to estimate the impact of market disclosure on the natural log 
of the number of alerts, tia ,  for vulnerability i .  The model estimated is tiititi uxa ,,, )ln( ++= αβ  where tix ,  is the 
vector of control variables, iα  are the random effects, and tiu ,  is the error term.  This analysis allows an empirical 
answer to the hypothesis that markets decrease the overall volume of alerts generated (Hypothesis 3). 
Selection of Disclosure to Market or Non-Market 
Before examining the effectiveness of the market mechanisms, we first compare the vulnerabilities disclosed 
through the two mechanisms.  For this comparison, we use the entire set of vulnerabilities contained in the NVD.   
While there are several repositories of vulnerability information, the NVD contains a large cross sections of 
vulnerabilities consistently reported.  Similar large scale analysis have been done of vulnerabilities (Frei et al. 2006), 
but have not focused on the selection of disclosure mechanism.  During 2006 and 2007, the NVD published 
information about 13,249 vulnerabilities.  Of these, 345 (2.6%) were initially reported by one of the two market 
mechanisms.  Table 1 shows descriptive statistics about all of the vulnerabilities disclosed during 2006 and 2007. 
We use a logit model to analyze the selection of disclosure through the market or non-market mechanism.  Table 2 
shows the influence of vulnerability attributes on the likelihood of being disclosed through a market mechanism 
versus a non-market mechanism.  The logit analysis indicates that vulnerabilities which only require network access 
are associated with non-market disclosure.  Similarly, vulnerabilities based on access violation, input validation 
errors, and design omissions are also associated with non-market disclosure.  Conversely, market disclosures are 
associated vulnerabilities of medium complexity or which impact system confidence or availability.  The log 
likelihood and Wald χ2 indicate that the model is a good fit and, although the pseudo-R2 is an incomplete measure, 
does explain some of the variance. Overall, the analysis suggests that there are distinct associations between some 
vulnerability attributes and resultant disclosure mechanism. 
Table 3 shows a similar analysis to Table 2, but examines changes in attribute influence through 2006 to 2007.  
Based on the logit analysis, none of the explanatory variables shift their influence from market to non-market during 
the time period.  However, the magnitude of some of the coefficients changes significantly.  For example, while 
vulnerabilities which require only network access (instead of local access) to exploit are consistently more often 
reported through non-market mechanisms, their association with non-market disclosure increases in strength during 
the period of the study.  Also, which input validation based vulnerabilities are initially strongly associated with non-
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market disclosure in early 2006, by the end of 2007, they are as likely to be disclosed though one mechanism as the 
other.  Overall, this suggests there are some minor changes in the attributes of vulnerabilities which are being 
disclosed through each type of mechanism. 
 
Table 3: Selection of Market or Non-Market Disclosure Over Time 



















































































































Observations 3112 3381 3574 2980 
Log likelihood -139.26106 -335.76698 -485.92231 -433.99179 
Pseudo R2 17.65 7.65 11.42 9.09 
Wald χ2 110.23 
*** 75.18*** 113.78*** 98.92*** 
Logit model (dependent variable is 1=market, 0= non-market ), robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
Two-tailed significance: * (p<0.10); ** (p<0.05); *** (p<0.01). n = 13,249  
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Table 4: Choice of Exploitation of Vulnerabilities 
 Within Sample Within One Month Within One Week 
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Observations 1055 1055 1047 1047 804 804 
Log likelihood -397.2295 -396.8439 -239.6904 -238.4691 -132.3755 -130.2724 
Pseudo R2 9.05 9.14 10.36 10.82 15.17 16.52 
Wald χ2 70.91
*** 72.37*** 52.28*** 54.45*** 52.85*** 54.37*** 
Logit model (Dependent variable is 1=exploited, 0= non-exploited), robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
Two-tailed significance: * (p<0.10); ** (p<0.05); *** (p<0.01). 
Empirical Examination of Market Effectiveness 
First, we examine how market or non-market disclosure affects the risk of the vulnerability being exploited.  The 
logit regressions in Model 1 and Model 2 (Table 4) indicate that disclosure through a market mechanism does not 
significantly affect the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited.  Interestingly, medium complexity 
vulnerabilities are less likely to be exploited than low complexity, but high complexity are not.  Attackers also 
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appear to be more likely to exploit vulnerabilities impacting system integrity.  As expected, the availability of 
patches reduces the likelihood of exploit as attacker may feel that their chances of success are diminished.  The 
availability of a signature increases the likelihood of exploitation providing some evidence that attackers gain 
information about how to exploit a vulnerability by examining a signature.  Because the sample is censored at the 
end of 2007, the similar analysis was done using a proportional hazard model (Table 5).  In both estimations, we see 
no evidence that market disclosure increases the likelihood that a vulnerability will be exploited. 
Table 5: Risk of Exploitation of Vulnerabilities 
 Complete Sample Within One Month Within One Week 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 0 Model 1 Model 0 Model 1 
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Failures 153 153 74 74 39 39 
Log likelihood -859.405 -858.665 -380.595 -378.633 -189.239 -186.9790 
Wald χ2 49.86
*** 50.86*** 2643.01*** 2192.94*** 6984.87*** 5729.36*** 
Cox proportional hazard model; failure is exploitation of vulnerability, robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
Two-tailed significance: * (p<0.10); ** (p<0.05); *** (p<0.01). Observations = 1252. 
Based on these results, we find no support for Hypothesis 1A or Hypothesis 1B that markets increase or decrease the 
risk of exploitation.   
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Table 6: Volume of Alerts based on Market or Non-Market Disclosure 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 






















































































































































































Age (ln)   0.0421*** 
(0.0055) 
   0.0419*** 
(0.0055) 
Patch Available    0.0033 
(0.1181) 
  -0.0053 
(0.1206) 








Fixed Effects  month month month month month month 
Within R2  1.22 1.26 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.26 
Between R2  2.95 3.44 2.95 4.56 3.9 5.9 
Overall R2  2.77 3 2.78 3.11 3.28 3.83 
Wald R2 1680.39*** 1708.44*** 1686.00*** 1689.74*** 1680.74*** 1725.99*** 
Panel regression; dependent variable = log of the number of alerts; n = 139,347; 343 vulnerabilities  
robust standard errors in parenthesis. Two-tailed significance: * (p<0.10); ** (p<0.05$); *** ($p<0.01$).  
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Next, we examine how market or non-market disclosure affects the speed with which a vulnerability is exploited.  
The logit regressions in Model 3 and Model 4 (Table 4) indicate that disclosure through a market mechanism does 
not significantly affect the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited within one month of disclosure.  However, 
Model 5 and Model 6 do indicate that market disclosure decreases the likelihood of exploitation during the week 
after publication.  (Similar models using time periods shorter than one week show similar results, but lack statistical 
power primarily due to the reduced number of exploitations in general as the time period shrinks.) This is important 
because decreasing the likelihood of exploitation in the short term allows for IT infrastructure professionals to 
implement countermeasures such as patching.  Based on these results, we find support for Hypothesis 2 that markets 
decrease the risk of exploitation shortly after disclosure. 
Finally, we examine the volume of alerts generated by a vulnerability.  The panel regression in Table 6 is based on 
139,347 daily observations of each vulnerability for 960 client locations.  Model 1 shows that the volume of alerts 
increases as the age increases.  Model 2 finds no evidence that the availability of a patch reduces the volume of 
alerts.  Model 3 finds that the availability of a signature increases the volume of alerts.  Finally, Model 4 and Model 
5 show that disclosure through a market mechanism significantly reduces the volume of alerts issued.  Based on 
these results, we find support for Hypothesis 3 that markets decrease the volume of alerts from a vulnerability. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Overall, the theoretical impact of market-based mechanisms for disclosure are not clear.  While markets increase 
incentives for security research, they may have a negative impact due to the likelihood of information leakage 
(Kannan and Telang 2005).  Based on a large scale empirical study of real alerts from intrusion detection systems 
across 960 clients for two years, we find evidence of market effectiveness. 
First, while market disclosure does not increase or decrease the likelihood that a vulnerability will be exploited, it 
does decrease the likelihood of exploitation during the one week period after disclosure.  This decrease is important 
for practitioners in that it allows more time to implement countermeasures.  Further, it indicates that while leakage 
may happen, there are potentially positive aspects of leakage.  Second, market disclosure does reduce the volume of 
alerts.  Because of the overwhelming number of alerts, mechanisms which reduce the volume of alerts can help 
administrators better allocate resources. 
In general, while information leakage may be occurring, the loss in welfare may be offset not only by incentive 
gains but also by positive aspects of leakage as others in the security community are made aware of vulnerabilities.  
This aspect points to opportunities for research to model and to quantify both the benefits and costs of information 
leakage.  Future research could also help quantify the impact of specific incentive levels in increasing the 
vulnerabilities discovered.  Research would also be valuable that helped understand if markets are truly providing 
incentives or are just compensating those would be researching and disclosing anyway. 
Finally, the evidence of effectiveness is encouraging for both policy makers and the security community.  Markets 
can be effective.  Mechanisms that combine the incentive structures and positive aspects of information sharing 
while restricting the negative consequences of leakage could positively impact social welfare.  It is towards these 
mechanism designs that our research provides encouragement. 
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